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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLINTON C. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
AMERICAN CASUAL·TY 
COMPANY, 
Defendant an,d Respondent. 
Case No. 
10775 
STATE,MKNT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff, as an insured under 
a group accident insurance policy, to recover benefits 
vrovided in the policy for permanent and total disability. 
DISPOSITION IN 11HE LO\VER COURT 
At thP pre-trial hearing before the District Court 
the court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
1 ment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the summary judgment 
of tho District Court for defendant and for an order 
1 
directing summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, or 
that failing, for an order remanding the case to tlw 
District Court for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the pre-trial hearing before the District Court, 
defendant and plaintiff moved for summary judgment. 
For purposes of its motion only and to avoid any issues 
of fact, defendant assumed that the facts alleged by 
plaintiff were true and contended that as a matter of 
law its motion should be granted. 
Plaintiff's answers to defendant's interrogatorie:-; 
establish that plaintiff intended to rely principally on 
his testimony to Pstablish that he received hodily injuries 
through accidental means and solely upon thP rnedieRI 
testimony of Dr. Kenneth J. Nielson and Dr. K Daniel 
~ussbaum to establish that his disability was caused hy 
the alleged accident independent of all othn causes. 
(Interrogatory No. 1, R. G, and answer thereto, R. 9) 
The facts assumed to he true by defendant consist 
of the statements made hy plaintiff and Dr. Kenneth .J. 
Nielson in their respective depositions (R. 22, 21), both 
of which were published prior to the pre-trial hearing, 
and by Dr. g_ Daniel Nussbaum in his affidavit (R. 
24-25 ). 
In July, 19G-+, plaintiff was an t>rnploy<'<> of tlw 
State of Utah and was insm·<>d undPr a gronp a<'ciclPnt 
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insnranet> polie~· earrit>d by the State of Utah with 
defrndant. 
At the time of the alleged accident plaintiff was 
Pmployed by the State l lealth Department in its building 
in a dual capacity as a repairman and a janitor. Approxi-
mately five months previous to the alleged accident he 
harl bt>Pn Pmployed as a janitor only, a job he had held 
for four years, and he definitely considered the duties of 
a janitor to be lighter work than the duties of a repair-
man ( R. 22, pp. 3-4). As a repairman, he was expected 
to perform all ty1ws of repair in the building, excluding 
only those repairs that he was not technically qualified 
to perform (R. 22, p. 6). Pursuant to his job as a 
rPpairrnan, he was required for five days, July 13th to 
lith inclusive, 1964, seven hours a day, to work on 
drilling a hole through an eight-inch cement wall with 
a thirty to thirty-five pound eleetric rotary drill to locate 
and repair a broken hot water line. Approximately one-
half thP time he worked without help (R. 22, 9-11). This 
work caused him to perspire very heavily and to be-
rome completely exhausted. 
On Saturday, July 18, 1964, he stayed at home and 
l'Pstl:'d. On Sunday, July 19, 19G4, he and his wife drove 
to l\Ianti for a family rNmion and returned home that 
PV<ming. On that PVPning at approximately 11 :00 o'clock 
, P.l\L., plaintiff awakPned with what he described as a 
"l'harley horse" in his left hand which soon spread to 
Iii:-; lt>ft sidt> and thPn to his whole body (R. 22, p. 15). 
During thP tinw it took to rush plaintiff to a local 
l1ospital, tlH-'Hl' "charl<-'~· hors<.>s," or seizures, developed 
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into grand mal seizures which continued for a period of 
twenty-four hours. 
Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on .Jul~, 
23, 1964, and his doctor released him for return to work 
on August 30, 196-±, because "he had had a very satis-
factory recovery" (R. 21, p. 1-1). r:Chinking he was ready 
(R. 22, p. 23), plaintiff returned to work on Augm;t 30. 
1964, and worked until September -±, 1964, during whieh 
time his physical condition deteriorat<•d and lw becmw• 
unable to perform any typP of physical lahor. Thi~ 
condition Pxists to the present tinw. 
Dr. Nielson cared for plaintiff prior to tlw alleged 
accident, during the illness claimed by plaintiff to have 
been caused by said accident, and continues to care for 
plaintiff now. He testifi(•d at his deposition that at the 
time of plaintiff's alleged accidrnt, plaintiff was suffer-
ing from several diseases or infirmities, including prior 
brain damage and pulmonary emphysema. lfo further 
testified that the brain damage was a primary under-
lying cause of the seizures (R. 21, p. 12) and that the 
emphysema restricted plaintiff's vital capacity fifty 
percent and was a significant factor in the cause of tllP 
seizures ( R. 22, p. 13). 
Dr. Nussbaum is of the opinion, as set forth in his 
affidavit (R. 2-±-25), that the seizures whiC'h disabled 
plaintiff were caused by the interaction of plaintiff '8 
damaged brain and the strenuous activity that plaintiff 
was engaged in prior to tlw seizures. He also stairs 
that had plaintiff not suffered prior brain damage, llP 
would not have had the seizures. 
4 
In granting defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, the District Court made the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
1. The pleadings, admissions and affidavits on 
fil<' show that then' is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the defendant, American 
Casualty Company, is entitled to a judgment that 
plaintiff reeover nothing by his claim, as a matter 
of law. 
2. It clearly appears from the undisputed evi-
dence that plaintiff's total disability was not caused 
b~' an accident. 
3. If an accid0nt oceurred, it clearly appears 
from the undisputed evidence that at the time of 
the accident plaintiff was suffering from two dis-
t>ases or infirmitit>s, which cooperated with the acci-
dent, if there was an accident, resulting in his disa-
bility (R. 13-14). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUD-
ING THAT PLAINTIFF'S TOTAL DISABILITY WAS NOT 
CAUSED BY AN ACCIDENT. 
On page -1- of plaintiff's brief the insuring terms of 
the poli('y as set forth in plaintiff's complaint are recited: 
". . . Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries 
through aecidental lllf'ans which directly and 
independently of all other causes, caused plaintiff 
to beeoHH' pen11anently and totally disabled.'' 
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The Gtah SuprernP Court has stafod that the tennH 
of an insuran('e poliey should be interpreted to mean 
what the average man who enters into a rontract with 
an insurance eornpany would <'Onsider them to mean. 
In other words, the plain, ordinary and popular meaning 
in the common speech of man is the meaning to be ap-
plied by the courts. Richards v. Standard Acc. !11s. Co., 
58 Utah G22, 200 Pac. 1017, 1020 (1921). 
It is submitted in this case that not onl~T 'lrnnld the 
common man not understand or consider the events 
complained of to constitute accidental means, but thP 
plaintiff did not. The following questions and answers 
appear on page 9 of plaintiff's deposition (R. 21): 
"Q. Now, would you describe for me, please, 
what the accidental means were which haw~ caused 
this injury? 
A. Well, I don't know as I - just how 
would I explain that, Gary'" (Gary Theurer, the 
plaintiff's attorney) 
It is significant that plaintiff is unable without 
relying upon his attorney, to explain what the accidental 
means were which allegedly occurred. In other words, 
even allowing plaintiff's understanding of the meaning 
of the terms of the contract to control, rather than the 
understanding of the common man, which is a far stricter 
test from the defendant's point of view, it is still apparent 
that no accident occurrt>d. 
From the answer just quoted, dt>fenrlant's eounsd 
was still unahlr to dett>rminr what the accident com-
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plained of was and continued the deposition by leading 
the plaintiff as follows: 
"Q. "\Veil, what constituted this accident~ 
~\Vlwre did the accident occur? What accidental 
means trans pi red? 
A. It was the strenuous labor and in the 
confined, hot area that I had to work." (Drilling 
the hole in the cement wall) 
It is readily apparent that strenuous labor is not 
an accident under the plain, ordinary and popular sense 
of that word. rsing the guideline of the common man's 
understanding of the term accident, the Supreme Court 
has defined accident as follffws: 
"An accident within a polic~v of accident in-
surance is an event which takes place without 
one's foresight or expectation and which proceeds 
from an unknown cause, or an unusual effect of 
a known cause not within the expectation of the 
person insured, that is to say, the term involves 
the happening of nn event suddenly, unforeseen 
and unexpected." Billings v. Continental Life Ins. 
Co., 81 Utah 572, 21 P.2d 103, 106 (1933). (Em-
phasis added) 
Plaintiff was a repairman; he considered his duties 
heavy work, and he continued to do the work which he 
now alleg<-'S was an accident for a period of five days 
without informing his superiors that he thought the 
work was too hard for him to do (R. 21, pp. 28-29). Nor 
does plaintiff allege the exhaustion caused by the stren-
uous labor was an unexpected and unforeseen result of 
said labor. To the contrary, plaintiff testified that he 
thought the work that he was required to do would nor-
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mally result in extreme tiredness and fatigue and that 
the job would take him several days to complete (R. 22, 
pp. 12, 29, 35). 
It is thereforP, abundantly clear that accPpting all 
the statements of fact of plaintiff as true and consider-
ing them in a light most favorable to plaintiff, that the 
event complained of did not happen suddenly, unfore-
seen or unexpected. Therefore, the District Court did 
not err in concluding plaintiff's total disability was not 
caused by an accident and in granting sunnuary judg-
ment in favor of defendant. 
Authorities supporting the proposition that strenu-
ous labor or exertion resulting in harm does not con-
stitute an accident are found in 10 Couch on Insurance 
2d, § 41.136. 
However, plaintiff states that he did not foresee or 
expect the seizures 01· the resulting effect, the total 
disablement (Plaintiff's brief, p. 8). In other words, 
plaintiff contends that because the end result or effect 
was unforeseeable or unexpt'cted that the means causing 
it were accidental. In support thereof, plaintiff cites 
Handley v. Mittual Life Ins. Co., 106 Utah 184, 1-17 P.2d 
319 (1944). Jn this case action was brought on a double 
indemnity provision in a life insurance policy providing 
coverage in the event the insured died solely through 
accidental means. The insured died from pulmonary 
embolism caused by a blood clot following an 01wration 
for a hernia. The court allowed recovery saying that 
the death was an unexpected result of the operation. 
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However, a close reading of the case shows that the 
plaintiff admitted that the flow of the blood clot into 
the pulmonary arter~' was an unexpected result of the 
operation. And basPd thereon, the court found that the 
death wa8 caused by accidental means. 'The rationale 
of the II((.ndlry case was more fully explained later by 
tlw TTtah 8upreme Court in Kellogg v. California West-
ern States Life Ins. Co., 114 Utah 567, 201 P.2d 949 
( 1949). The court lw ld in that case that the unexpected 
death of the insured ensuing from shock due to an opera-
tion did not make the death accidental within the mean-
ing of a double indemnity proyjsion of an insurance 
contract. In reaching that decision, the court referred 
to the H a11dlry case and said: 
"It would seem that if death was an unex-
pected result of an operation the efficient cause 
and effect relationship is not between the intended 
act - the operation - and the death, but between 
death and :-;ome other intervening cause. In the 
Handley ease such an independent cause was 
capable of physical ascertainment - the blood 
clots. The ca use for them was unknown, but 
tlH'Y were not considered as anything necessarily 
inht>rent in the nature of the operation. A failure 
to link tht>m as necessarily inherent in the opera-
tion justified tht> detennination that they were 
accidt>ntal - that they were the independent link 
in a general chain of causation which was violent, 
e.rtrrnal nnd accidental." (Id. at 952) (Emphasis 
added) 
'l1lms, it is clPar that tlw court in the Handley case 
when it said "accidental lllt>ans are those which produce 
Pfft>cts which art> not their natural or probable conse-
quenres'' was reforring to the cause of the death - the 
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blood clots - which formed unexpectedly bt'hind the sitfi 
of the operation and not to the death as the unexpected 
effect. In other words, the Utah Supreme Court requires 
an unforeseen, unexpected cause rather than an unfore-
seen, unexpected result, before accidental means can be 
found. Plaintiff claims no such cause other than the 
strenuous labor and exhaustion, which he admits was 
foreseen and expected. 
In each of the following cases, recovery was allowed 
on an accident insurance provision after an unforeseen, 
unexpected cause of the accident had been found: What-
cott v. Contme.nt<il Casualty Co., 85 Utah 406, 39 P.2d 733 
(1935) (insured died during an operation because of an 
unforeseen and unexpected hypersusceptibility to anes-
thesia); Billings v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 81 Utah 
572, 21 P.2d 103 (1933) (insured was suddenly and 
unexpectedly thrown from truck he was driving and 
sustained a severe cut on his finger which later caused 
blood poisoning and death); Carter v. Standard Acc. 
Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 Pac. 259 (1925) (insured died 
from accidentally taking an overdose of laudanum); and 
Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 58 Utah 
622, 200 Pac. 1017 ( 1921) (insured died from sunstroke 
after unexpectedly walking 20 miles during the heat of 
day in the desert without sufficient water rather than 
riding a horse 12 miles at night with sufficient water 
as planned). 
Moutzoukos v. Mittual Ben. Health & Accident Assn., 
69 Utah 309, 25-± Pac. 1005 (1927) involved an injury 
of an insured which was sustained by him whilP volun-
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tarily lifting a timber in the regular course of his work. 
1,his case is not controlling and appears to have been 
overrult>d by subsequent cases decided by the Utah 
Supreme Court. I.e., Kellogg v. California State Life Ins. 
Co., supra. 
Other jurisdictions require an unforeseen, unex-
prcted eause rather than such a result, and have rejected 
strenuous labor as such a cause in holding that no accident 
occurred. In Ha.rris v. John Hancock Mutual Life In-
surance Company, 41 N.J. 565, 197 A.2d 863 (1964), it 
was held that a heart attack caused by exertion in per-
formance of insured 's regular work moving heavy tanks 
was not within the coverage for disability arising out 
of bodily injury sustained as a direct result of an acci-
dPnt. Tlw court said: 
"[W]lwre the policy does not, by its language, 
give coverage for simply an accidental result but 
requires that there be 'something accidental, in 
the common and popular sense, in the cause of 
the resulting injury, i.e., in the events preceding 
and leading up to it' ( 40 N .• J., at p. 526, 193 A.2d, 
at p. 225), the language cannot be construed to 
insure merely against an accidental result. 
\Vhether the preceding events - the means or 
cause of the bodily injury resulting - are acci-
dental will be determined by the reasonable 
appreciation, understanding and expectation of 
the average policy purchaser in light of and hav-
ing in mind the limiting language of the insuring 
clause." (Id. at 864) 
In Sniith v. Continental Casualty Company, 203 A.2d 
lfi8 (D.C. Cir. 19fi4) action was brought on an accident 
policy pursuant to the death of a resident engineer on 
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a road project. Following exertion by him of elirnhing 
up and dovm an ernhanknwnt to Pxamine bridge footing:-; 
he suffered a heart attack and died. In directing a 
verdict in favor of defendant, the court said: 
"In the case at bar, although the insured's heart 
attack was preceded by physical exertion in his 
ascent from the excavation incident to his super-
visory responsibilities, he neither slipped or fell, 
nor was he struck by any falling object, nor was 
there any fortuitous event at the time which trig-
gered his heart attack, assuming, argitcndo, but 
not conceding that the heart attack could he ac-
cepted as a bodily injury contemplated by the 
policy. Clearly no accident, in the common ac-
ceptance of the term, interfered with his move-
ments at work on the day in question and thereb~' 
produced a bodily injury which was the sole, 
exciting, efficient and predominant cause of death 
of the insured who was normally performing the 
duties of his appointment." (Id. at 169) 
See also, Hender son i:. Hartford Accidrnt and ]ll 
demnity Comparny, 268 N.C. 129, 150 S.E.2d 17 (1966) 
(fireman's death due to inhalation of smoke not caused 
by an accident). 
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff's contention that 
the end result is the unexpected and unforeseen element 
·which constitutes an accident within the meaning of tht> 
policy in question, neither the facts of this cast> nor the 
authorities cited by plaintiff would support a reversal 
of the District Court's conclusion that no accident O(' 
curred. It will be shown under POINT [J of the argu-
ment of this bri('f that at the time of the aeeident, 
plaintiff was suffering from diseases or infirmities of 
12 
which he was fully awan•. rrherefore, plaintiff foresaw 
and PxpectPd or should have foreseen and expected that 
the activity in which he was voluntarily engaging would 
result in an injury to him. Accordingly, under the Utah 
law above cited, the end result or the injury could not 
lw <'onsiden•d an accident. 
POINT II 
IF, IN FACT, AN ACCIDENT OCCURRED, THE DIS-
TRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT PLAINTIFF WAS SUFFERING 
FROM TWO DISEASES OR INFIRMITIES WHICH COOPER-
ATING WITH THE ACCIDENT RESULTED IN HIS DIS-
ABILITY AND THEREFORE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
PLAINTIFF IS PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERY. 
It has he<>n rerognized by the T"Ttah SuprPme Court 
tl1at there are thr<'<' distinct typPs of cases arising under 
accident imrnraneP polieies dPaling with the effect of a 
disPaS<' or infirrnity of tlw insurPd on the liability of 
th<' insurer: ( 1) ~When the accident causes a diseased 
condition which, together with the accident, results in 
th<> injury or d<'ath complained of, the accident alone 
i11 to he considen'd as the cause of the injury or death; 
(2) when, at the time of the accident, the insured was suf-
foring from some disease, hut the disease had no causal 
t·onnection with tlw injury or death resulting from the 
aecident, the accident is to he considered tlw sole cause; 
un w}wn at the tillH' of the accident, there was an exist-
ing disea::-;e "·hich, cooperating with the accident, re-
1-'llltPd in the injnr~· or death, thP accident cannot be 
<·onsidPrPd as the sole rause or as the cause independent 
of all otlwr causPs. Rrowni11_q v. Equitable Life Assu.r. 
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Soo. of the United States, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1070, 
1073-74 (1937). 
Plaintiff concedes in his brief on page 12 and plain-
tiff's doctor testified at his deposition that plaintiff 
was suffering from at least two diseases or infirmities 
at the time of the accident which cooperated with the 
alleged accident to cause the disability. 
Dr. Kenneth J. Nielson's testimony is summarized 
as follows: Prior to and at the time of the alleged acci-
dent, plaintiff was suffering from chronic pulmonary 
emphysema which caused permanent scarring and loss 
of elasticity of plaintiff's lungs reducing his ability to 
inhale and exhale air to fifty percent of a normal per-
son's capacity. Said disease restricted plaintiff from 
doing heavy work since that type of work would result 
in shortness of breath and rapid heart beat (R. 21, pp. 
3-5). Plaintiff was also suffering from incapacitation 
of his left arm, a residual impairment from a prior 
injury which had left his brain in a damaged condition 
(R. 21, pp. 7-10). The relation of the brain damage to 
the seizures is stated in the doctor's deposition as 
follows: 
"Q. Would you be willing to state that had 
Mr. Thompson not suffered this brain damage that 
he would not have experienced this seizure? 
A. Yes." (R. 21, p. 10) 
At other points in the deposition, Dr. Nielson testi-
fied that the brain damage ·was the primary underlying 
cause of the seizures (R. 21, p. 12) and that emphysema 
with fifty percent impairment of vital capacity would 
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he a significant factor in the cause of the stroke and 
the seizure ( R. 21, p. 13). In concluding the direct 
examination of Dr. Nielson, reference was made to a 
letter addressed to the Utah State Industrial Commis-
sion (attached as Exhibit 2 to R. 21) setting forth his 
opinion and the opinion of another doctor as to the 
cause of the stroke and the resulting disability. 
"Q. .Now, with reference to the last paragraph 
which I have just read, it is your opinion that at 
the time of the alleged accident that Mr. Thomp-
son is complaining of there was an existing 
disease or injury which contributed or which 
cooperating with the accident resulted in his dis-
ability? 
A. Yes, there was the underlying disease 
and something precipitated obviously. 
Q. Is it your opinion that Mr. Thompson 
had a damaged brain at the time of the alleged 
accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was this damage caused by his fall from 
a horse several years ago? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it your opm10n that Mr. Thompson 
was suffering from a pulmonary disease at the 
time of the accident f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it your opm1on that the stroke and 
seizures complained of were caused by the inter-
arti on of three factors, ( 1) the damaged brain, 
( 2) pulmonary disease, and ( 3) strenous activity 
that l\fr. Thompson was t'ngaged in a week pre-
ceding his stroke'? 
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A. Yes. rrhat would probably include th1· 
electrolytic imhalancp and activity, the strenuou~ 
activity. 
Q. Your answer is yes, with that addition? 
A. Yes." (R 21, pp. 16-17) 
Dr. Nussbaum is of tlw opinion that tlw seizures 
which disabled the plaintiff WPre causf'd by the intPr-
action of plaintiff's brain damage and the strenuous 
activities plaintiff was engaged in prior to the seizllrPS. 
He also states that had plaintiff not suffered prior brain 
damage that he would not have had the seizures (R. 
24-25). 
Dr. Kielson and Dr. Nussbaum are the only meclieal 
witnesses upon whom plaintiff intended to rely a.t trial 
(Interrogatory No. 1, R. 6 and ans\ver thereto, R. 2) 
and the tf'stimony from each of them clearly establishes 
that at the time of the alleged accidt>nt plaintiff was 
suffering from pre-existing diseast>s or infirmities which 
cooperating with the alleged accident resulted in hiti 
disability. 
In Titcker v. "l\'ew York Lifr' I us. Co., 107 Ftah -i78, 
155 P .:2d 173 ( 1945), the deceased insured had fallen 
and broken his arm, which fall increased his blood prrs-
sure and caused a dissecting aneurism of the aorta 
resulting in his death. ri1he decedent's heirs made a 
claim against the insnranee company under a douhlP 
indemnity rlause which provided coverag·e upon rpcript 
of due proof that the death of tlw insun'd I'Pt·mltPd from 
accidental causes. On defendant's appeal from thP trial 
eourt's judgnwnt for plaintiff, the Supl'l'11H" Comt ::-:aid 
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tlH· factual problem submitted to the jury for determina-
tion was: 
'' ... [vV]hether the deceased died from the 
effect of the accident, causing a diseased condi-
tion which resulted in death, or whether the de-
crased, at the tirne of the 0accident, had an existing 
disease u·hich, co-operating with his accident, 
resulted in the insured's dea.th." (Id. at 175) 
(Emphasis added) 
In reversing the trial court's decision in favor of 
the plaintiff, the Supreme Court relied upon testimony of 
a physician called as a witness at the trial which was 
a:;; follows: 
''Q. Then I take it, Doctor, that it is your 
opinion that Mr. Nichols did not have a healthy 
aorta? A. It is. 
Q. And that tlw aorta was damaged by dis-
ease? A. Yes. 
Q. And that ~Tour opinion is that the dissec-
tion which ultimately resulted in death was caused 
by the interaction of two factors - one, the dis-
eased condition of the aorta, and two, an increased 
hlood pressllre attending this fall'? A. Yes." 
After noting this testimony, the Supreme Court con-
eluded: 
"nfr. Nichols' condition at the time of the 
accident was one in which he had had an existing 
disease whiC'h co-operated with the accident in 
Pausing his death. This compels us to conclude 
that the accident eannot be considered the sole 
C'anse of irnmred's death, and from this factual 
picture, we must C'onclude that this case is one 
that falls within tlw third class of cases as set 
forth b~· :\[r . .J nstice Larson's opinion in Brown-
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ing v. Equitahh• Life Assur. Society, supra, and 
th<> cases there cited." (Id. at 176) 
In Clayton 'V. Metropolitan Life Ins. Cu., 96 Utah 
331, 85 P.2d 819 ( 1938), the claimant on an msurance 
policy, while mowing his lawn fell on the handle of the 
mower which hit him in the abdomen, causing him injury 
which partially disabled him until an appendix operation 
was perf onned. The insurance company appealed the 
judgment against it on the grounds that the claimant 
had a diseased appendix at the time of the accident 
and that this contributed to the disability and should 
bar recovery. At trial, the court had instructed the 
jury as follows : 
"If you believe from all the evidence in the 
ease that plaintiff's appendix was in a disease<l 
condition and that the accident which occurred 
on October 27th lighted up or aggravated a dis-
eased condition or infirmity causing the same to 
become active or acute he cannot recover for any 
disability resulting therefrom and your verdirt 
must be for the defendant." (Id. at 821) 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against 
the defendant stating that the jury, pursuant to the 
instruction, must have determined that tht> appendix 
was not in a diseas<>d condition at the tinw of the acci-
dent. It is apparent that the ahove quoted instruction 
is a rule of law in Utah with regard to existing diseases 
at the time of an alleged accident. 
Plaintiff has cited Lee r. Neu.: York Life Ins. Co., 
95 Utah ±-15, 82 P.2d 178 (1938) and White v. National 
Postal Tra.rtsport Ass11., 1 l"'.".2d 5, 261 P.2d 92-1: (1953) 
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as authority for the proposition that although plaintiff 
was afflicted with a disease and an infirmity which 
eontributed to his disability, that the disability was still 
the result of an accident within the terms of the policy. 
In the Lee case, the insured was hit in the abdomen 
h~- a tongue of a trailer which he was attempting to dis-
Pngage from an automobile. At a later date, it became 
necessary to remove his appendix and in so doing it was 
found that his gall bladder wa.s infected and that it had 
been ruptured at a previous time. A few days after the 
appendix operation, the insured died. The doctor testified 
the death occurred from the effect of the accidental blow 
which ruptured the gall bladder and released the inf ec-
tion to the appendix, making the operation necessary. 
The Supreme Court sustained the trial court's verdict 
for plaintiff on the theory that the disease in question 
was latent or dormant and that had the blow not rup-
tured the diseased gall bladder, the deceased would not 
have suffered any ill effects from the disease. In the 
White case the court held that the evidence was sufficient 
for a jury to find that an accidental blow to the insured 's 
leg reactivated an inactive heart condition which led to 
his death, or in the alternative, that the blow started an 
nnbroken ehain of eircumstances which led to his death 
independently of an~· rontributing cause. The factual 
distinctions between the Lee and White cases and the 
instant case are obvious. Neither plaintiff's brain damage 
nor his pulmonary emphysema rould be classified as 
latent or donuant; he was suffering ill effeets from 
hoth of them at the time of the accidt->nt, and his medical 
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witnesses statP that both of tht>rn contrilmted to tltP 
lllJUry. 
First National Bw11k v. Equital;le Life Assur. Soc. 
of the Unite,d States, 225 Ala. 58(i, 1-1-1 So. -151 ( 1932) 
disallowPd rPcovery becam;p of pre-<.>xisting brain dam-
age of the insured. In that case thP insured fell on th(' 
floor of his hotel room and, as a rPsult of the fall, died. 
Suit was brought under the double in<lt•nmity clause 
of a life insurance contract which providl~d coverage if 
death orcurred by accident inde1wndent of all other 
causes. The evidence established that at the tiine of tht• 
fall plaintiff was suffc>ring from a pre-existing brain 
infirmity consisting of adhesions to the interior of tlw 
skull, a result of a previous blow to the hack of his head. 
The medical witnesses concluded that tlw blow on tlw 
temple by the fall in the room ruptured the adhesions 
leading to menengitis and death. They further agreed 
that the fall would not have caused death but for these 
adhesions of the brain. In holding for the dt>fendant, tlw 
court said because the insured was suffering from a 
disease which vv'as accelerated and aggravated by thP 
accident so as to lw a cause cooperating with it to pro-
duce the fatal end, then' could be no reeovery. 
Pre-existing lung diseases including pulmonan· 
emphysema of the insured resulted in a disallowancP 
of a claim by the insured's administrator on an accident 
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insurance policy in Shulman v. Midual Benefit Health 
aud Accident Association, 267 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1959). 
The insured suffered a blow on the chest when moving 
a heavy object and subsequently died from pneumonia. 
The defendant produced evidence from doctors who had 
attended the deceased prior to and during his terminal 
illness who stated that the alleged injury sustained by 
insured was merely an aggravation of pre-existing lung 
dist~ases, including chronic bronchitis and pulmonary 
Prnphysema. Although one of the doctors advised that 
the injury to deceased's sternum which was caused by 
the blow undouhtedly interfered with his ability to 
breath, tlw court affirmed the district court's summary 
judgment in favor of defendant because plaintiff could 
not show that the loss of life resulted from the trauma 
din·ctly and indqwndently of all other causes. 
In Alessandro t'. Jlassachusetts Casualty Ins. Co., 
42 Cal. Rpt. 630 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), the plaintiff 
made a elaim against the insuranee company insuring 
against accidental bodily injury. On the day in question 
he 'ms repairing a refrigerator walk-in box which was 
~unken about one foot in the ground and it was neces-
sary to bend forward in an awkward position. ·when he 
tried to straight!:'n up he felt as though his body from 
the waist down was paralyzed. It was later diagnosed 
as a herniat!:'d dise. Based upon the !:'vidence submitted, 
the trial judge found that at the time of the alleged acci-
dPnt, plaintiff "·as suffering from degenerative inverte-
hral disc clisPase of the lmnbar spirn• and any disability 
~nff<•rpd h.Y appellant was proximately caused by and 
1rns a dirPct rPsult of th!:' ::;aid pre-existing disease. In 
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sustaining the trial court's holding against the plaintiff, 
the appellate court said: 
"If no considerable injury at all would have 
resultPd had the appellant not been afflicted with 
the existing disease or condition, then the acci-
dent could not be considered the proximate cause 
of the harm, but rather the disease must be so 
considered. (Herthel v. Time Ins. Co., 221 Wis. 
208, 265 N.W. 575; Egan v. Preferred Ace. Ins. 
Co., 223 Wis. 129, 269 N.W. 667, 107 A.L.R. 1107)" 
(Id. at 633) 
In summary, it is clear from the testimony of both 
medical witnesses upon whom plaintiff intended to rely 
at trial, that at the time of the alleged accident plaintiff 
was suffering from pre-existing diseases or infirmities 
which cooperated with the alleged accident resulting in 
his disability. Therefore, defendant was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law as set forth in the Utah cases 
and other authorities cited above and the trial court did 
not err in granting summary judgment in favor of de-
fendant. 
POINT III 
THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF FACT WHICH SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND THE GRANT-
ING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
WAS NOT ERROR. 
It is absolutely clear from the testimony of plain-
tiff's medical witnesses, as set forth above, that thf' 
alleged accident was not the sole cause of the disability 
but that tlw pre-existing diseases were contributing 
causes. For purposes of its motion for summary judg-
ment, defendant assumed this medical testimony to h(• 
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true and there being no issues of fact, the trial court 
eorrectly decided the issue as a matter of law and granted 
smmnary judgment. Shulman v. Mutual Benefit Health 
and Accident Association, supra (court granted sum-
mary judgment when evidence established existing dis-
ease contributed to injury). For purposes of its motion, 
defendant also assumed that plaintiff's statements with 
regard to the factual situation surrounding the alleged 
accident were true, consequently there was no issue of 
fact to be determined hy a jury. Therefore, it was proper 
for the court to rule as a matter of law that no accident 
occurred. In Harris 1:. John Hancock Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company, supra, the plaintiff complained of an 
alleged injury occurring while he was engaged in his 
work moving two heavy steel tanks from a truck to a 
platform. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in revers-
ing a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and direct-
ing a judgment in favor of defendant, said: 
"vVhere the resultant injury is to the heart, 
brought on by reason of exertion from activity, 
voluntarily pursued, in which nothing unexpected 
or unforseen occurs beyond the injury itself, and 
there is nothing which a layman would under-
stand to be an accident, the average policy holder 
could not reasonably reach a conclusion of cov-
erage. Therefore, as a matter of law, there is 
no issue thereon to be submitted to the trier 
of facts and recovery cannot be had.'' ( 197 A.2d 
at 864) 
However, it is strongly asserted that for purposes 
othf>r than its motion for summary judgment, defendant 
does not assume or agrPe that the facts as alleged by 
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plaintiff or his witnesses are true. To th(~ contrary, 
defendant would assert that the circumstances surround-
ing the alleged accident were far different than those 
claimed by plaintiff. For example, plaintiff's super-
visor and eo-worker would testify and have testified in 
another proceeding (In the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah, Clinton C. Thompson, Plaintiff, vs. The In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, ct al., Defendants, No. 
10642, filed June 7, 1966) that the plaintiff worked a 
mere six hours on the job in question, that he never 
worked alone, that the last time he worked on said job 
was over four days before the stroke, and that the work 
he did was relatively easy. Further, medical experts 
have concluded in the same proceeding that the strenu-
ous labor was in no way connected with or precipitated 
the seizures and resulting disability. It is obvious that 
if plaintiff accepted these facts as true, as he had to do, 
for purposes of his motion for summary judgment, that 
the motion could not be granted. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court in considering all of the evidence 
presented did not err in granting summary judgment 
for defendant on the alternative grounds that there was 
no accident, or if there was an accident, that it was not 
the cause independent of all other causes, which rendered 
plaintiff totally disabled. Therefore, the District Court's 
judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. ROBERT WRIGHT 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& :McDonough 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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